State v. Armstrong Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41458 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-15-2014
State v. Armstrong Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
41458
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Armstrong Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41458" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5007.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DUSTIN THOMAS ) 
ARMSTRONG, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 41458 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2538 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 3 
I. This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add Additional 
Burdens Upon A Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence 
Was Seized During A Warrantless Search ................................................. 3 
A. Introduction .......................................................................................... 3 
8. This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add 
Additional Burdens Upon A Defendant Who Has 
Established That Evidence Was Seized During 
A Warrantless Search ........................................................................... 3 
II. The State Has Failed To Establish That The Board Of Corrections 
Can Constitutionally Delegate Its Duty To Other Entities ........................... 6 
Ill. The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of The 
Circumstances, The Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle Was 
Unreasonable, Therefore Violating The Constitutional Prohibitions 
Of Unreasonable Searches Such That All Evidence Resulting 
From That Search Should Have Been Suppressed .................................... 8 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 8 
B. The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of 
The Circumstances, The Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle 
Was Unreasonable, Therefore Violating The Constitutional 
Prohibitions Of Unreasonable Searches Such That All 
Evidence Resulting From That Search Should Have 
Been Suppressed ................................................................................. 9 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 16 
Cases 
Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494 (Ct. App. 1988) ................ 7 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) ............................................... 9, 10, 11 
State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484 (2004) ........................................................ .4, 5 
State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452 (1993) ................................................................ 5 
State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342 (2011) ............................................................... .4 
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (2000) ................................................................. 5 
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227 (Ct. App. 1983) .................................................. 13 
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841 (1999) ................................................................. .4 
State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878 (2005) ..................................................... .. 
U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. ·112 (2001) ........................................................ 9, 10, 12 
Constitutional Provisions 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution ............................................................. 6, 9 
Idaho Const. art. 11, § 1 .......................................................................................... 7 
Article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution .............................................................. 3, 5 
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution ........................................ passim 
Additional Authorities 
Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon The 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (6th ed. 1890) ............... 7 
Oxford English Reference Dictionary 2nd ed. 1996 .............................................. 1 O 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dustin Thomas Armstrong appeals from the Judgment of Conviction in which the 
district court adjudged him guilty of grand theft. In this Reply Brief, Mr. Armstrong seeks 
to clarify that the burden of proving that a specific exception to the warrant requirement 
is the State's, and asks this Court to decline the State's invitation to also require a 
defendant to object to, and disprove, each exception proffered by the State. 
Mr. Armstrong also asserts that the District Court properly found that the search was 
unreasonable, such that the State's assertion that the constitutionality of the search 
should be upheld on alternative grounds lacks merit. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Armstrong's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court reject the State's invitation to add additional burdens upon a 
defendant who has established that evidence was seized during a warrantless 
search? 
Has the State failed to establish that the Board of Corrections can constitutionally 
delegate its duty to other entities? 
3. Did the District Court properly find that under the totality of the circumstances, 
the search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle was unreasonable, therefore violating the 
constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add Additional Burdens Upon A 
Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A Warrantless 
Search 
A. Introduction 
The State has asserted that because "[Mr.] Armstrong did not argue that article 
X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution ipso facto prevented the parole officer from allowing law 
enforcement officers from other agencies to act as her agent," Mr. Armstrong failed to 
preserve the issue and this Court should not consider it. Mr. Armstrong notes, despite 
the State's claims to the contrary, he did object to the admission of the evidence and his 
burden of proving that it was discovered during a warrantless search of his vehicle was 
met when the State conceded as much. Thereafter, it was the State's burden to prove 
an exception to the warrant requirement, including that the police were agents. The 
failure of the State to address a necessary prerequisite to establishing agency should 
not prevent this Court from addressing the question. Rather, this Court should reject 
the State's invitation to add additional burdens upon a defendant which are not 
supported by Idaho case law. 
B. This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add Additional Burdens Upon 
A Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A 
Warrantless Search 
Counsel for Mr. Armstrong objected to the admission of evidence seized in 
violation of Mr. Armstrong's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
He moved to suppress "all evidence seized as a result of the detention of the defendant 
and subsequent search of his vehicle without a search warrant." (R., p.63.) Counsel 
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asserted the waiver contained in the parole agreement "is limited to parole officers ... the 
detention of the defendant and the search of his vehicle were done by police officers 
rather than parole officers. Furthermore, there were no parole officers on scene when 
the search was executed." (R., p.66.) Thus, contrary to the State's assertion on 
appeal, Mr. Armstrong both objected to the admission of the evidence, and presented 
grounds for the objection - the warrantless search of his vehicle. 
The State conceded "the police officers did not secure a search warrant in this 
case." (R., p.75.) The State asserted that the search "was conducted pursuant to the 
administration of Probation/Parole as an exception to the warrant requirement." 
(R., p.76.) The State further raised the claim that police can act as an agent of 
probation and parole and conduct a search authorized by a probation and parole officer. 
(R., pp. 76-77.) "The search of Defendant's vehicle was authorized by Officer Jeffries, 
but carried out by police acting as 'agents' of Probation and Parole." (R., p.76.) 
"The burden is on a defendant to show the illegality of a search; however, once 
the search is shown to have been made without a warrant, the search is deemed to be 
unreasonable per se .... " State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842 (1999). The burden of 
proof then rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486 (2004) (citation omitted). When 
the State seeks to rely upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement, "The 
burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies." State v. Hansen, 
151 Idaho 342, 346 (2011) (citation omitted). 
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The now appears to assert that Mr. Armstrong not only had to object to the 
admission the evidence and establish that the search was a warrantless one, but also 
had to object to the exceptions asserted by the State, and disprove them. ( See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10 (asserting the issue was not preserved because 
Mr. Armstrong failed to more specifically object to the State's assertion of the exception 
of consent by agency, and failed to disprove the State's theory by citing article X, § 5). 
The cases relied upon by the State do not support this assertion. In Vondenkamp, this 
Court declined to address whether a witness should have been excluded from testifying 
as a discovery violation sanction. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 883 (2005). 
The Court declined to address the issue because no sanction was ever requested in the 
trial court. Id. at 884. In Enyeart, the defendant objected to the lack of foundation for 
testimony, thus this Court declined to address the separate question of the testimony's 
helpfulness. State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454 (1993). In Holland, this Court 
declined to address the constitutionality of a seizure when only the search had been 
challenged below. State v. Ho/land, 135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). In none of these cases 
has this Court held that a defendant has the burden of objecting to, and disproving, 
each of the exceptions to the warrant requirement asserted by the State. Rather, this 
Court has clearly stated that the burden to prove an exception to the warrant 
requirement is on the State. Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486. 
Moreover, unlike the parties in the cases cited by the State, Mr. Armstrong 
specifically objected to the admission of the evidence when he filed a motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.54, 63.) He also asserted the grounds for the objection asserting that 
the search of his car was done without a warrant and in violation of both the Fourth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. (R., p.63.) Finally, he specifically requested the relevant sanction when 
he asked the trial court "for an order suppressing all evidence seized as a result of the 
... search of his vehicle without a search warrant." (R., p.63.) Thus, Mr. Armstrong 
preserved the issue by meeting all his burdens in the trial court. 
As noted above, Mr. Armstrong met his burden of objecting to the admission of 
evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his car. The State conceded that 
the evidence was found during a warrantless search. Thus, Mr. Armstrong preserved 
the only issue he was required to preserve. The State seeks to apply additional 
burdens on Mr. Armstrong, claiming that he also had a burden to object to, and 
disprove, each exception raised by the State. This assertion is not supported by 
assignment of burdens of proof clearly articulated in Idaho case law. Thus, this Court 
should reject the State's invitation to create additional burdens for the defendant. 
11. 
The State Has Failed To Establish That The Board Of Corrections Can Constitutionally 
Delegate Its Duty To Other Entities 
Relying upon two cases which address the contract and tort liability of entities 
when a nondelegable duty is breached, the State has asserted that a parole officer can 
"enlist the assistance of a police officer to act as her agent in fulfilling her duties." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) However, that an entity may continue to maintain liability 
when a nondelegable duty is breached does not change the nature of whether that duty 
was delegable. Neither of the cases relied upon address the fundamental tenant that, 
"Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the people, have located certain 
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authority it must remain." Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which 
Rest Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (6th ed. 1890), 
p.137; see also Idaho Const. art. II, § 1 ("The powers of the government of this state are 
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no 
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of 
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."). 
Additionally, the State appears to recognized that legislative authority cannot be 
delegated, but does not address or explain why another type of duty specifically placed 
upon a particular entity in the constitution could be delegated. (See Respondent's Brief, 
p.11.)1 As noted in the Appellant's Brief, Idaho Case law recognizes that the 
constitutional duties and authority of the legislative and judicial branches cannot be 
delegated. (See App. Brief, p.11.) The State has not provided either argument or 
authority to explain why, if this is true of the legislative and judicial branches, it is untrue 
of an executive branch entity. 
Mr. Armstrong respectfully notes that the State has failed to establish that the 
Board of Corrections can delegate its constitutional duty of control, direction, and 
management of parole to Idaho's police officers. 
1 As counsel for the State notes, in the Appellant's Brief, the word "legislative" was not 
included in a quote from Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 499 
(Ct. App. 1988). This was done inadvertently and counsel apologizes to the Court for 
the err. 
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111. 
The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of The Circumstances, The 
Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle Was Unreasonable, Therefore Violating The 
Constitutional Prohibitions Of Unreasonable Searches Such That All Evidence Resulting 
From That Search Should Have Been Suppressed 
A. Introduction 
The district court found that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car was not 
reasonable. (Tr., p.122, Ls.2-8.) In doing so, the court recognized, "[t]he limitation of 
the waiver informs the reasonableness of the search in this case." (Tr., p.122, Ls.7-8.) 
The State now seeks to have the order denying the motion to suppress affirmed on the 
alternative ground that the search was reasonable because "police officers could do 
precisely what they did in this case without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., 
search the vehicle belonging to Armstrong, who was on parole, without any suspicion 
whatsoever." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) However, the State's assertion simply ignores 
the analytical framework clearly articulated in the United States Supreme Court cases it 
cites and rests upon a logical leap that the Court literally stated it was not making. A 
review of the cases cited by the State reveals that the district court quite rightly 
considered the scope of the waiver signed by Mr. Armstrong as a salient factor in 
determining whether the search was reasonable, and properly concluded that the 
search in this case was unreasonable. 
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B. The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of The 
Circumstances, The Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle Was Unreasonable, 
Therefore Violating The Constitutional Prohibitions Of Unreasonable Searches 
Such That All Evidence Resulting From That Search Should Have Been 
Suppressed 
The State initially asserted that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car was both 
subject to the consent exception to the warrant requirement and reasonable because, 
as a parolee, Mr. Armstrong had a reduced expectation of privacy. (See R., p.76.) In 
its initial ruling, granting the motion to suppress, the district court found that the search 
was not reasonable. (Tr., p.122, Ls.2-8.) The court recognized that the scope of the 
waiver "informs the reasonableness of the search in this case." (Tr., p.122, Ls. 7-8.) 
The State did not challenge this finding in either its motion for reconsideration or 
memorandum in support. (See R., pp.93-104.) 
In determining whether a search of a probationer or parolee violates the Fourth 
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the question is 
whether the search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 
(2001 ).2 Reasonableness is determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Knights, 534 U.S. at 
118-19. 
2 Mr. Armstrong has asserted that the search violated his constitutional rights under 
both the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article I, § 17 of the 
Idaho constitution. (See App. Brief, pp.13.) He does not, however assert that the 
analysis in determining whether a violation occurred is different. 
9 
In determining the individual's privacy right, the Court has recognized that a 
search condition placed upon a probationer or parolee is a "salient" circumstance. 
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. This is because the conditions placed upon an offender help 
to define that individual's privacy interest. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 ("The extent 
and reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees like petitioner have 
severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone." (emphasis 
added)); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 ("The probation condition thus significantly 
diminished Knight's reasonable expectation of privacy."). The Court has also found two 
other circumstances "salient" to determining the reasonableness of the offender's 
expectation of privacy, whether the search condition was "clearly expressed" and 
whether the offender was "unambiguously" aware of it. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852; 
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
Despite this clearly articulated analytical framework, the State claims that 
"[a]lthough Samson involved actions taken pursuant to a statute that permitted 
suspicionless searches, the holding of the case stands for the broader proposition that 
[suspicionless] searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.15.) Essentially, the State is asserting that the statute at issue in Samson was 
irrelevant to its holding. This despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court 
specifically stated that: 1) the condition of release ordered, 2) whether it was clearly 
expressed, and 3) whether the offender was unambiguously aware of it, were "salient."3 
3 Salient is defined as "jutting out; prominent; conspicuous, most noticeable." Oxford 
English Reference Dictionary 2nd ed. 1996. 
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Contrary to the State's assertion of a "broader proposition," the holding in 
Samson, was actually based upon the specific facts of the case, making its holding 
quite narrow. Based upon Samson's status as a parolee, as well as the extent and 
reach of parole conditions clearly expressed in California statutes, which Samson was 
unambiguously aware of, the Court found, under a totality of the circumstances, 
Samson did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 
legitimate. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. In doing so, the Court was clear it did not "equate 
parolees with prisoners for the purpose of concluding that parolees, like prisoners, have 
no Fourth Amendment rights." Samson, 547 U.S. at 850, n.2. 
Application of the analysis from Samson to the case at bar reveals that 
Mr. Armstrong did have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 
legitimate. Comparison of the conditions imposed upon Samson and Mr. Armstrong 
illuminates the differences in the totality of the circumstances of the cases. 
Samson Condition Armstrong Condition 
"[E]very prisoner eligible for release on "Parolee will submit to a search of person 
state parole 'shall agree in writing to be or property, to include residence and 
subject to search or seizure by a parole vehicle, at any time and place by any 
officer or other peace officer at any time of agent of Field and Community Services 
the day or night, with or without a search and s/he does waive constitutional right to 
warrant and with or without cause."' be free from such searches." 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (quoting 
Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a)(2000)). 
Initially, the parole condition actually placed upon Mr. Armstrong was not nearly 
as broad as that placed upon Samson. While the condition in Samson allowed for a 
search by a parole officer or "other peace officer," Mr. Armstrong's condition was limited 
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to of Field and Community Services. Additionally, the search condition in 
clearly expressed that searches could not only be done by a parole officer, but 
also by an "other peace officer." Such was not the case with the condition imposed 
upon Mr. Armstrong. Rather, the condition limited the search to agents of Field and 
Community Services. 
Finally, Mr. Armstrong was not "unambiguously aware" that the condition allowed 
anyone other than agents of Field and Community Services to search. He understood 
the condition to which he agreed to mean "any parole agent under IDOC could search 
me or my car or my house." (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-9.) This is a reasonable understanding 
since, unlike the condition in Samson, there was no mention of other peace officers. 
Based upon the salient facts of this case, Mr. Armstrong had an expectation of 
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable, i.e. that he consented to 
warrantless searches by parole agents, not all "other peace officers." 
This Court must also consider the degree to which the search was needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19. The state 
has dual concerns with a parolee. First, rehabilitation, i.e. the hope that the parolee will 
successfully complete parole and be integrated back into society. Second, protecting 
society from future criminal violations, i.e. concern that a parolee will be more likely to 
engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. See Knights, 
534 U.S. at 119-121 (describing the State's interest in probationers); Samson, 547 U.S. 
at 853 (finding same interests with parolees). 
The search in this case was not premised upon the State's interest in integrating 
Mr. Armstrong back into society. It has been recognized, "For probation authorities to 
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evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the probation officer must 
a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment and personal habits." 
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 231 (Ct. App. 1983). This is the basis for allowing 
probation officers to visit a probationer's home without a warrant. Id. The same can be 
said for parolees and parole officers. That was not, however, true in this case. First, 
although the parole officer involved could have gone to the location and at least 
observed the search, thereby gaining insight into Mr. Armstrong's environment and 
personal habits, she choose not to. (See Tr., p.44, Ls.12-25.) In addition, the parole 
officer that authorized the search did not have prior knowledge of Mr. Armstrong and 
knew nothing about his progress, save the accusations made by Mr. Armstrong's 
mother. (See Tr., p.38, Ls.10-15.) Thus, this search was not conducted to evaluate 
Mr. Armstrong's progress in reintegrating into society. 
Neither did the officer authorize the search simply based upon the accusations 
made by Mr. Armstrong's mother. Instead, it is simply Officer Jefferies' practice to ask 
for a search of a car "100 percent of the time when police called with probationers or 
parolees." (Tr., p.117, Ls.14-19.) Although Officer Jefferies did state that the report he 
was using drugs caused concern about whether Mr. Armstrong was following the terms 
and conditions of parole, her basis for authorizing the search was not that narrow. 
(Tr., p.38, L.10 - p.39, L.4.) Rather, "pretty much all the time, if I get a phone call that 
they've got a parolee or probationer pulled over, I ask for a K9 search of the vehicle." 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.1-4.) This is true even if the basis of the stop is running a stop sign. 
(Tr., p.42, Ls.16-20.) Subjecting parolees to searches every time they interact with a 
police officer doesn't help them integrate into society, rather it continues to set them 
13 
apart and treat them as than other citizens. One would think such searches would 
foster a resentment of police and authority when the person and his belongings 
are being searched not by the person helping to reintegrate them, but rather by police 
officers tasked with ferreting out crime. 
The search in this case was not designed to, nor did it, advance the State's 
interest in integrating Mr. Armstrong into society. 
Finally, the State's interest in protecting society from future criminal violations, 
i.e., concern that a parolee will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an 
ordinary member of the community. The basis of concern in this case was 
Mr. Armstrong's mother's report that he had impliedly threatened her by suggesting she 
would be dead by the time he turned 39, and she believed he was using 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5, p.114, Ls.5-25.) However, the officers that spoke 
to Mr. Armstrong didn't appear to have the same concerns. Those officers weren't 
aware of any crime that Mr. Armstrong had committed. (Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.74, L.2.) 
When speaking with the officers Mr. Armstrong was "calm," "easy, laid-back going," 
"polite, very respectful" and cooperative. (Tr., p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.2, p.79, Ls.10-12.) 
The officer conducting the K9 search of Mr. Armstrong's car also had reason to question 
whether Mr. Armstrong was engaged in criminal conduct. Officer Calley had Officer 
Walbey run a K9 search on Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) The dog did not 
alert when he was run on the outside of the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-15.) Prior to actually 
entering Mr. Armstrong's car, everything the officers had observed served to dispel any 
suspicion leveled by Mr. Armstrong's mother, yet the officers continued to extend the 
stop and further invade Mr. Armstrong's privacy. This was unreasonable. 
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Based upon the totality of the circumstances in this the district court 
properly found that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car by police officers investigating a 
"narcotics call" was unreasonable. Thus, the court properly ordered suppression on that 
basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above argument and authority, as well as that contained in his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Armstrong respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district 
court's judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 201 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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